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INTRODUCTION

The Challenge
Events of the past decade provide compelling evidence that the national security environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace and in unpredictable directions. Further, it is clear that meeting the demands of the evolving environment calls for new levels of adaptable military capabilities that, in turn, demand joint forces that are responsive and effective across a range of operations from small scale operations through major theater conflict. In the two most recent major contingencies -Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) -we have seen new levels of understanding of the need for truly integrated joint capabilities and new levels of innovation in leveraging existing capabilities to achieve the needed level of effectiveness. Lessons Learned activities have verified important shifts in focus leading to a series of emerging concepts for more effectively integrating capabilities. The following are some examples of those emerging concepts:
1. Integrated joint capabilities -a step well beyond deconflicting joint forces -an example is the close integration of fire and maneuver with joint fires supporting agile ground forces maneuver in OIF;
2. Distributed operations vice contiguous forces -supporting rapid movement to close on objectives, controlling activity rather than geography enroute to the objective -an example is the 3 rd Infantry Division dash to Baghdad; 3. A single parallel joint campaign vice sequential maritime, air, and ground campaigns -an example is the tactical surprise achieved with the near simultaneous ground invasion and air attacks against strategic and tactical targets in OIF;
4. Survival by knowledge and agility vice surviving kinetic effects with armored protection -an essential enabler of distributed operations;
5. On-time logistics focused ruthlessly on supporting combat operations with minimum logistics footprint vice just-in-case logistics with a massive theater footprint -a key to strategic responsiveness in both OEF and OIF;
6. Integrating special operations, conventional ground forces, and joint firesessential to effective air operations in OEF, battlespace preparation in OIF, and control of activities in large segments of Iraq in OIF, and;
7. Effects-based operations and assessment vice input-based operations and battle damage assessment.
These examples and others provide compelling evidence of the value of efforts to enable and strengthen joint force capabilities. At the same time, these experiences identify a number of areas where there is a clear need for further progress in enhanced joint force capabilities. Some examples -not an exhaustive list -are:
1. Strategic agility -the ability to engage with the needed force capabilities to quickly establish control of the situation and set the conditions for resolution.
2. Deeper intelligence preparation of the battlefield to inform operational decisions with a credible, more comprehensive understanding of adversary force capabilities, culture, and attitudes.
3. Better management of ISR assets and accurate integrated information for commanders at all levels 4. Enabling net-centric operations -providing the connectivity and information for distributed collaborative planning and integrated execution of missionsstrategic, operational, and tactical.
5. Providing more responsive joint fires to support continuous, distributed operations enabling agile fire and maneuver against key objectives to achieve intended effects.
6. Retail logistics that can keep pace with fast moving, sustained joint forces combat.
Terms of Reference
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) charged the Task Force with recommending ways to enhance the capabilities of our joint forces. As defined in the terms of reference (TOR), the specific purposes of the task for are as follows (see the Phase I Report of the DSB Task Force on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities, dated August 2003.)
1. Help identify specific characteristics and examples of organizations that could be capable of accepting responsibility and accountability for delivering the capability with needed responsiveness.
2. Review and understand the current state of assigned responsibilities and accountability for joint capabilities to quickly bring combat forces together and focus them on joint objectives across a wide spectrum of possible contingencies.
3. Recommend further steps to strengthen the joint structure ability to quickly respond with effective joint force operations employing integrated Service-and Agencyprovided force capabilities.
The central theme of the task force is the challenge of ensuring that our forces are structured, equipped, and trained to come together quickly for effective joint force operations. The task was divided into phases. Phase I concentrated on the first two purposes. This report on Phase II builds on the Phase I work, other work on acquisition approaches and Lessons Learned activities concentrating on the third purpose. The current plan is for Phase III to focus in more depth on the challenges of command and control directing and in support of joint operations.
DELIVERING JOINT CAPABILITIES
Previous Defense Science Board (DSB) work and other ongoing work in the DoD agree that providing needed joint capabilities requires changes in the process for identifying and delivering joint capabilities. The changes need to address at least the following three areas:
1. Responsibilities and accountability within DoD need to be clarified and enforced.
a. The Joint World (The Chairman, JCS; combatant commanders, and the Joint Staff should have the lead responsibility for identifying key joint capability gaps and should be actively involved in prioritizing needs.
b. The force providers (Services and Defense Agencies) should propose solutions to those needs, and structure and execute approved acquisition programs.
c. The Office of the Secretary of Defense should have the lead in prioritizing the needs identified by the Joint World, choosing solutions proposed by the force providers to meet needs, and then, overseeing the execution of approved acquisition programs.
2. Joint Combatant Commanders should have a much stronger voice in identifying and prioritizing joint capability gaps that impact their ability to perform their assigned missions.
3. A business plan is required that relates resources and timelines to capability needs and that serves as the basis for measuring program performance and for establishing and ensuring accountability for delivering needed capabilities.
The following are the key recommendations from the Phase I effort. A more detailed description and set of recommendations is in the Phase I Report. 
COMBATANT COMMANDER'S JOINT FORCE CAPABILITIES RESPONSIBILITIES
The Newly Assigned Missions
The regional combatant commands face the challenge of a large and growing increase in the pace and scope of operations within their areas of responsibility (AORs). While this increased demand calls for expanded focus on support for operations within the AORs, this report focuses on the global and functional commands that must support all the regional combatant commands and their own global missions. Within the past year and a half, there have been significant changes and expansion in the assigned responsibilities of these combatant commands as capability gaps important to enabling joint capabilities are defined and addressed. The following is a list of newly assigned missions and the authority for each. The aggregate list provides a formidable challenge in organization and implementation. Combatant commands progress towards meeting these capability needs varies widely and is strongly driven by:
US
1. clarity of the mission assignment, adequacy of guidance and authority, 2. component and other support, and, 3. command personnel resources -in numbers and qualification.
The first of these --clarity of mission assignment and adequacy of guidance and authority --has at least two aspects. One is the understanding of the assigned combatant command of its new mission. The other is how the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and other combatant commands perceive the scope of that combatant command's responsibilities.
The following chart provides our assessment of items 1 and 2 above for each of the 19 missions. We did not address personnel resources.
1 The combatant commands have the needed guidance, authority, and support 2
The combatant commands are progressing towards the needed capability but require additional clarity and support 3
There are serious obstacles to progress
TASK FORCE ASSESSMENTS
This section addresses Task Force assessments of the state of affairs for each of the 19 newly assigned missions. The following provides further insights into areas that are rated 2 or 3 in the preceding chart and that serve as the basis for the recommendations to follow. A judgment regarding the adequacy of guidance, authority, and support is not a judgment regarding overall progress in building the capability to execute the newly assigned mission to the needed level.
Further, the quantity alone of tasks shown in the table above for JFCOM should be reason to carefully re-examine whether any command could adequately handle such a broad portfolio of newly assigned missions. The Task Force suggests that some priorities are needed to ensure attention to the tasks most essential to enabling joint force capabilities.
Mission 1 -Standing JTF
• Now that each regional combatant command (RCC) is establishing a standing JTF headquarters in its theater, JFCOM needs appropriate direction from the CJCS and Secretary of Defense: o Develop and exercise the specialized functional staff "plugs" (e.g., CBRN cell, deployment cell, lessons learned cell) to be inserted into the RCC JTF headquarters when required. o Develop and execute a system to ensure JTF HQ C2 systems in different RCCs remain interoperable with the C2 systems of the service component HQs and units that will deploy worldwide, from JFCOM and other regional commands, to form JTFs.
• The Deployable Joint C2 system (DJC2) is an integral part of SJFHQ capabilities. The program is not synchronized with the directed time lines for the SJFHQs.
• The relationships between JFCOM and STRATCOM in this area are defined in a Memorandum of Agreement that has been signed by the two combatant commanders.
Mission 2 -Joint Battle Management and Command and Control (JBMC2)
• The JFCOM role in JBMC2, as currently defined by JFCOM, seems to embrace full responsibility for integration of all C2 systems used by JTFs, current and in development. The MOA between JFCOM and STRATCOM clarifies one part of the set of relationships. However JFCOM's authority over Service programs is not established and in its current form the JBMC2 roadmap lacks priority and emphasis on solving the near-term interoperability needs of the RCCs.
• The authority of JFCOM over hundreds of programs integral to JBMC2 (almost all developed and maintained by Services) is also not clear, e.g. DJC2, Family of Integrated Operational Pictures (FIOP), Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP). The CJCS and the SecDef need to ensure clearly assigned authority and a process to provide for a coherent set of programs in support of JBMC2 objectives.
• JFCOM should assume the role of identifying shortcomings and enforcing fixes (either by its own authority, or by submitting recommendations to USD AT&L or USC Comptroller) for interoperable joint C2 capabilities that meet RCC needs and that are interoperable on a global scale to ensure that forces maintaining readiness in any theater can operate effectively when integrated with joint forces in other theaters.
• To repeat a still valid finding from the Phase I EJFC work, JFCOM needs a small Joint C2, Networks, and Information Systems Command with dual-hatted Service Components to provide the systems engineering support needed to be effective in the assigned or implied roles
Mission 4 -Joint Force Provider
• The mission and authorities need further clarity. UCP 02 assigns responsibility only for CONUS based forces. At one time, that was considered the major source of contingency response forces. This is no longer the case. To support recent contingencies, capabilities have been resourced from worldwide forces.
• Various stakeholders have interpreted the role as manger (recommending forces), monitor (maintaining knowledge of force risks and status) and provider (mobilization, deployment, rotation). The roles are significantly different and the apparent expectation has varied in various contingencies. There is confusion over division of force provider and force manager roles among JFCOM, RCCs, Services, and the Joint Staff. The planned movement of the force manager role to the Joint Staff will need to be accompanied by clear direction as to the roles of the various stakeholders.
• Clear policies are also needed for full-cycle readiness reporting, for database interoperability, and for OPLAN capability packages.
Mission 5 -Joint Deployment Process Owner
• JFCOM has identified 19 stakeholders, 23 management and oversight organizations, 170+ supporting systems, and 183 major process activities. There will need to be a fundamental change in authorities to create a true process owner, as JFCOM's role in the deployment process is not dominant.
• A fundamental problem with the deployment system is that is designed to support deliberate plans and large units. It is not designed to support deploying the tailored joint task forces that are now the rule in military operations. A fundamental need for a responsive joint deployment system is deployable units with clearly defined capabilities and accurate unit load lists and response times that are agreed, accurately reported, constantly updated, and checked and exercised regularly. A more flexible system and this level of discipline are required for a credible basis for rapid contingency deployment planning and execution. There needs to be clear authority with the force provider (JFCOM) to create such a system, in cooperation with the supported commanders, the supporting commanders and the military departments, and authority to enforce it.
Mission 6 -Joint Lessons Learned (JLL)
• The CJCS assigned responsibility for JLL to JFCOM. Accordingly, JFCOM has stood up an organization to institutionalize the process. However, JLL has become a cottage industry and there needs to be authority and process to bring the output of the various Service and other JLL activities together and to translate the lessons into actions that improve current and future capabilities. The process needs to embrace the full range of doctrine, operations, training, material, leadership, personnel and facility (DOTMLPF) implications.
• The Department Lessons Learned process needs to include an interface with the resource allocation process to enable the accepted lessons to be quickly implemented.
Missions 7 & 8 -Interagency and Multinational Transformation and Interagency and Multinational Information Sharing
• While the multinational mission fits with the formation of the NATO Transformation Command, there has been no designation of the US Government lead for interagency transformation. Planning and decision-making authority for all departments and agencies except for DoD is in Washington headquarters. The Task Force does not believe that improvements in interagency responsibility can be driven or led outside of the Washington-based OSD and the Joint Staff. Further, responsibilities for multinational transformation are much broader than NATO and must depend strongly on RCCs.
• The flow of information among agencies deployed to a conflict and within the multinational coalitions is a critical enabler of transformational concepts and capabilities. Currently each RCC is pursuing a separate program for coalition information sharing and interoperability. JFCOM should be assigned as Executive Agent to lead the development of one system for coalition that can be used by all of the RCCs.
Mission 9 -Mobilization
• The mission is assigned to JFCOM without the authority to execute. At present JFCOM can recommend changes to mobilization processes but has no authority to direct changes.
• The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), OSD, Joint Staff, Service Hq, Reserve Component Chiefs, combatant commanders and component commanders all have major roles. Massive cooperation or clear authority is required to make needed changes. Clear authority is more likely to be effective than massive cooperation.
Mission 11 -Joint Urban Operations (JUO)
• The responsibility as Executive Agent (EA) for JUO was assumed by JFCOM in January 03. The JUO executive agent mission is clear and encompasses much more than urban related concept development and experimentation. It is to lead, coordinate, and integrate the urban operations doctrine, organization, training, and equipment activities of the DoD Components to improve and transform the capabilities of joint forces for conducting urban operations over the full range of urban contingencies. JFCOM was also provided with a JROC approved JUO master plan.
• Requisite authorities and control of resources needs to be clearly provided to JFCOM to accomplish this important and challenging mission. The process of maturing the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) within the joint staff is instructive. Control of resources enabled JTAMDO to grow from putting purple borders around Service inputs to having a major influence on the planning and programming for joint theater air and missile defense capabilities.
Mission 12 -Distributed Process Owner (DPO)
• This mission is clearly assigned to USTRANSCOM with the needed direction and activity is well underway. Still, the magnitude of the interfaces across the military and commercial transportation and distribution system make this a formidable task much of which remains to be defined.
• There are some 250 information systems involved in the distribution system. While TRANSCOM does not need involvement in anything like 250 systems, they do need the clear authority to require the needed flow of information into a system something like the Global Transportation Network. They will need clear IT domain authority to achieve that end. The GTN will also require a direct interface with the deployment systems.
• Further, to build the needed systems and interfaces, TRANSCOM is likely to need some limited acquisition authority for distribution system development.
Mission 13 -Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
• Although relationships are developing, there is still overlap and friction among USSOCOM, the RCCs and the CIA on roles and responsibilities in the global war on terrorism.
• SecDef needs to make it clear that USSOCOM has the responsibility for:
o Global intelligence preparation of the environment, taking advantage of RCC intelligence centers for regional expertise and support; o Developing DoD's global campaign plan for the war on terrorism, taking advantage of RCC regional campaign plans; and o Responsibility for conducting individual DoD operations to capture or kill terrorists or destroy terrorist infrastructure when USSOCM is the most effective commander for a particular operation.
• Individual operations should be conducted by RCCs when the situation makes them the most effective commanders.
Mission 14 -Psychological Operations (PsyOps)
• The mission has been assigned to USSOCOM but is not well defined. Psychological operations can cover the spectrum from the broadest strategic purposes to tactical operations. USSOCOM has extensive experience at the tactical level reaching into the operational (campaign) level. This is not the case for the strategic level, which must be coordinated with government wide programs to support the national and possibly coalition campaign.
• A more streamlined process is needed to provide responsive PsyOps support of operations from battlespace preparation to combat operations.
• The global information operations (IO) mission is assigned to USSTRATCOM and PsyOps is one of the five pillars of IO. However, there is agreement that USSOCOM is the PsyOps provider in support of both theater and global operations.
Mission 16 -Global Missile Defense
• The global role is to STRATCOM. STRATCOM and NORTHCOM have reached agreement on COCOM and OPCON authorities for the 2004 Ground Based MidCourse system. • There are major issues yet to be addressed regarding rules of engagement, command relationships, command and control, and battle management. These issues need to be addressed in detail with participation by STRATCOM, regional combatant commanders, the Missile Defense Agency, the Joint Staff, and OSD.
Mission 17 -Global Information Operations (IO)
• There has been major progress in this area with the Commander STRATCOM designating a Deputy Commander for Planning and Integration and the proposal to dual-hat the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency as the Deputy Commander for Network Operations and Defense.
• There are remaining issues regarding the interfaces with regional combatant commands and other agencies.
• The Task Force believes that the range of the disparate activities included in the current broad definition of global information operations is a hindrance rather than a help to these separate activities. The Task Force recommends disaggregating the assignment of IO responsibilities assigned STRATCOM, focusing on global computer network operations, electronic warfare in and from space, strategic deception, and strategic psychological operations. Of the remaining activities -tactical military deception and information security are every commander's business with no special relationship to the STRATCOM mission set. Responsibility for tactical psychological operations is properly assigned to USSOCOM.
Mission 18 -Global C2 Services
• It is particularly important that this mission be clearly defined since successful support of the mission requires extensive interfaces and multiple players. There are a number of distinctions and implications essential to success in this mission. o The first is the division of responsibility between USSTRATCOM for global services and USJFCOM for regional interoperability and support for regional C2 systems. Both combatant commanders and ASD/NII have signed a MOA between USSTRATCOM and USJFCOM. o The second is the distinction between C2 services and the C2 function. The C2 function is conducting command and control. C2 services provides the systems and communications enabling the function. USSTRATCOM has responsibility for the C2 function for their global missions. The regional combatant commanders have responsibility for C2 functions within their AOR and for ensuring that their regional systems can interface as needed with global services.
o The third issue has to do with responsibility for delivering and operating the needed global systems. This responsibility is shared among USSTRATCOM, ASD/NII, DISA, and several other agencies. A well-defined mechanism for the needed coordination and cooperation in essential.
Mission 19 -Global ISR
• This mission assignment was not part of Change 2 to the UCP due to the difficulty in achieving agreement within the relevant ISR communities. A recent document signed by the CJCS clarifies the specific assignments to USSTRATCOM. Still, there is a need for further clarification and agreement to ensure that there is an authoritative, responsive global provider of ISR.
• As in the case of Global C2 services, USSTRATCOM has the responsibility for ISR support of its own global strike mission, and for global support of the military operations of the regional combatant commanders.
• There is an array of other stakeholders in this area, e.g., the national authorities, the intelligence community, the military departments, the Joint Staff, and the newly created USD(I).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The scope of the newly assigned missions involve such a complex set of stakeholders and opposition, or apathy at best, on the part of some whose cooperation and support is needed that needed attention and direction must come from the Secretary of Defense. The alternative is to depend on time-consuming, often frustrating, attempts to produce a series of memoranda of agreement. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff should:
• Provide the needed manpower support for combatant commands to succeed in executing newly assigned missions essential to effective joint operations. This is not a burden to be avoided. It is among the most important needs of the Department.
• Re-examine the magnitude and the scope of the portfolio of missions assigned to USJFCOM to ensure that the tasks essential to enabling joint forces capabilities can receive the needed attention. This will require an examination of both newly assigned missions and pre-existing missions to provide for an executable portfolio of missions.
• Provide the needed policies and support the needed authorities to execute the newly assigned missions. Needed authority in the information domain to direct the flow of needed information into the Distribution Process system to provide for global visibility and direction and, Limited acquisition authority for distribution system development. o Commander, USSOCOM:
Clarification of authorities and responsibilities for the three tasks essential to the assigned global war on terrorism task -intelligence preparation of the battlefield, development and execution of a global campaign plan, and mission execution, A streamlined interagency approval process to support contingency operations from battlespace preparation to combat operations, and Defining strategic vs. tactical PsyOps roles, missions, doctrine, and capabilities, and relationships to other aspects of information warfare. o Commander, USSTRATCOM:
The full range of both Title 10 (support in the budgeting process) and operational support from the service component commands. Addressing this issue has dragged on for more than a year with numerous tank sessions and senior leadership meetings but with no meaningful resolution, Responsibility and authority to define, in coordination with ASD/NII and DISA, the global C2 services system and the interface standards for regional network connection to the global system for mission application interface with the global system, Responsibility for the operation of the global C2 services system to include the GIG and, One-stop shopping for global ISR capabilities to include campaign planning, force provider, defining and advocating capability needs and operating global surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
This set of newly assigned missions includes those clearly essential to success in meeting the strategic, operational and tactical objectives across a wide range of contingency operations. There has been significant progress in a short time. The Task Force believes that, with a modest additional level of resources and appropriate senior DoD leadership attention to ensure adequate guidance, authority, and support, the combatant commands 
